I remember waking early in Britain on 31 October 1984 and hearing that Indira Gandhi might have been assassinated. I watched the BBC reports, including those of Mark Tully, the BBC’s Delhi correspondent. Then came confirmation that she had been killed, followed by reports that the bodyguards responsible were Sikh.
Later, the BBC showed pictures of Sikhs in Britain celebrating. My mother warned that those pictures could make Sikhs in India less safe.
I record her fear without suggesting any link between those celebrations and the pogrom. The killing that followed Indira Gandhi’s death was organised, and responsibility belongs to those who planned, carried out and enabled it. [3, 6]
Then came the reports of killing and burning. I saw images of men with tyres around their necks being set alight. I could not understand how innocent people could be murdered like this while the police and authorities failed to protect them. At the time, I could not imagine it happening in Britain.
In the days that followed, being recognised as Sikh could bring attackers to a family’s door. People leaving for work, children and those at home faced a danger they could not control. Their protection should never have depended on what anyone elsewhere had said or done.
To remember November 1984 properly, we need to understand what happened to families during the killings and how they lived with their losses afterwards.
Giani Zail Singh, then President of India, publicly defended Operation Blue Star, the June 1984 army operation at the Sri Darbar Sahib complex in Amritsar. He also urged Sikhs working for the government, especially soldiers, to remain in their posts. [2, 9]
I examine those decisions, his earlier political actions and what his office did when families asked for protection. I also examine what his press secretary, Tarlochan Singh, did to help those families, and his later defence of the President.
Guru Nanak Sahib Ji’s Babar Vani, in Shabad Guru Granth Sahib Ji, speaks of the suffering caused by Babar’s invasion. The passage below comes from one of these Shabads, or sacred compositions. On Panna 360, the cries of those being slaughtered are brought before the Creator.
The Roman line is only a reading aid, not the translation. The English sentence gives the plain meaning.
Guru Nanak Sahib Ji says:
ਕਰਤਾ ਤੂੰ ਸਭਨਾ ਕਾ ਸੋਈ ॥
ਜੇ ਸਕਤਾ ਸਕਤੇ ਕਉ ਮਾਰੇ ਤਾ ਮਨਿ ਰੋਸੁ ਨ ਹੋਈ ॥੧॥ ਰਹਾਉ ॥
ਸਕਤਾ ਸੀਹੁ ਮਾਰੇ ਪੈ ਵਗੈ ਖਸਮੈ ਸਾ ਪੁਰਸਾਈ ॥
Karta toon sabhna ka soee.
Je sakta sakte kau maare ta man ros na hoee. 1. Rahao.
Sakta seehu maare pai vagai khasmai sa pursaaee.
Creator, You care for all. If one powerful person strikes another powerful person, no grievance arises in the minds of those who see it. Rahao. But if a powerful lion falls upon a helpless herd, the question is put to the owner of the herd.
Asa, Mahalla 1, Guru Nanak Sahib Ji, Panna 360; Rahao and the opening line of stanza 2, a continuous excerpt from the Shabad. [1]
Panna means page; Rahao marks the verse for pause and reflection, carrying the Shabad’s central thought.
The Shabad addresses the Creator. We should not turn those words into an address to a political ruler. Guru Sahib distinguishes a fight between powerful people from the killing of those who cannot defend themselves. Guru Sahib laments lives ruined and the dead left unattended. At the end, human pride is brought before the Creator’s judgement. Remembering the Creator through Naam, the Creator’s Name, requires us to give up self-importance.
That is the measure I bring to November. If I know someone is being attacked, I must do what I can to help, and I expect the same of any Sikh. This duty extends to anyone in danger and needs no public appointment. A person who can reach ministers, police and army commanders has greater means to obtain protection and greater responsibility for trying.
Those in power had a duty to protect Sikh families. The President had to follow his ministers’ advice and could not command the army however he chose. [10] But he still had to use his position to seek protection for people in danger.
I judge Giani Zail Singh by what he said publicly, what he tried to do and what help reached families. I believe his public defence of the June operation and his office’s response to the November killings failed those families. Tarlochan Singh must answer for his own actions too. Defending the President years later does not explain what he himself did when people were asking to be saved. [3, 9, 11, 13] Families had a right to protection, whatever their political views or understanding of Sikh history.
Nor can the history begin with Indira Gandhi’s death. June’s army action at Sri Darbar Sahib brought deaths within the complex and damage to Sri Akal Takht Sahib, the Sikh seat of authority within it. [2] That suffering shaped how many Sikhs understood November.
What was destroyed
The Nanavati Commission, the government-appointed inquiry that reported in 2005, accepted as broadly correct the Delhi death count established by the Ahuja Committee: 2,733 Sikhs. It also recorded Sikh representative bodies’ claim that the number exceeded 3,000. It described men burned alive, homes attacked, and shops, businesses and taxis looted or set on fire. The killing extended beyond Delhi. [3]
Darshan Kaur told the People’s Union for Democratic Rights what happened to her husband. She was nineteen and had three children when her husband, Ram Singh, was killed. She described the attackers dragging him by his hair, placing a tyre around his neck and setting him alight. The attackers smashed the water pots so that the family could not put out the fire. She never recovered his body. [4]
To me, those broken water pots show what protection had to mean: stopping the attackers while a family could still be saved.
We should let survivors speak about their grief without expecting a story about courage or hope. Praising their courage must not become an excuse to leave them without help.
The familiar image of a man burning with a tyre around his neck cannot stand for everything that happened. Women and children were killed too. The Nanavati Commission records Surinder Singh Kanwar’s account of an attack in Krishna Nagar: his brother, his brother’s wife and their elder son were burned; five children of the family were burned alive. [3]
Madhu Kishwar’s 1984 investigation for the magazine Manushi recorded women and girls dying in burning houses, and women being abducted and raped, including gang rape. It also recorded the pressures that kept sexual violence out of complaints: fear, shame imposed on women, and obstacles to medical examination and recording their accounts. [5] The people and institutions women turned to afterwards could make it harder for them to speak about what had happened. The shame belongs to those who committed and enabled this violence, never to the people who suffered it.
Women tried to protect relatives while their own safety was being destroyed. Some then had to find shelter and keep children alive after losing relatives and livelihoods. [5] We need to remember women as people in their own right, as well as mothers and widows. Children also belong in this history as people whose lives were taken or changed, as well as members of grieving families.
No one should have to speak publicly about sexual violence to receive help. If a survivor chooses to give an account, the survivor should decide how it is kept and shared. We must not use those details simply to shock readers when an anniversary comes around.
The Nanavati Commission found that attacks were organised from 1 November. Outsiders were directed towards Sikh homes, and fuel and other materials were supplied to the attackers. It recorded promises of protection and Sikhs being disarmed before attacks. It also named local leaders and workers of Congress (I), Indira Gandhi’s party, who took part. [3]
In 2018, the Delhi High Court described the mass killings as organised by political figures with help from the police and other bodies responsible for enforcing the law. It said the killings fitted the description of crimes against humanity. [6]
This was a pogrom. Calling it a riot can suggest that two crowds were fighting each other. Here, a community was being hunted. Officials and police did more than fail to arrive in time. The record includes their help in attacking the people they should have protected.
Before Giani Zail Singh became President
Tarlochan Singh’s defence looks back to Zail Singh’s earlier political work. Giani Zail Singh had been Chief Minister of Panjab from 1972 to 1977 and became Union Home Minister in 1980, before taking the Presidency in July 1982. [14]
Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale was a Sikh preacher and head of Damdami Taksal, an institution teaching Gurbani. [26] Writing in October 2022, Tarlochan Singh describes Congress support for candidates associated with Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale against the Akali Dal, the Sikh political party. This was during the 1979 elections for the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee (SGPC), an elected Sikh body that manages many historic Gurdwaras. [11]
Tarlochan Singh says Sanjay Gandhi, Indira Gandhi’s son, told Congress leaders, including Zail Singh, to help Bhindranwale’s group. He describes money being given to two political organisers to weaken Panjab’s Akali Dal government. [11]
Saying that Zail Singh had no personal contact with Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale does not settle whether he helped the group. Help could be given without a meeting. How far Zail Singh followed Sanjay Gandhi’s instructions remains unclear from this account. [11]
The account does not establish that Congress created Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale’s beliefs or following. I want to examine what Congress wanted to gain by supporting an existing religious movement, and what that cost Panjab. Any support Zail Singh gave must be examined, even though those supported later acted independently and he moved to higher office.
T.V. Rajeswar, who headed the Intelligence Bureau during these years, describes rivalry between Zail Singh and Panjab Chief Minister Darbara Singh. He recalls warning Indira Gandhi about interference in negotiations. He also reports claims that Congress encouraged Bhindranwale. But he does not treat every claim as proved. He treats one claim about Zail Singh passing on information as guesswork. He says another report of interference was investigated and rejected. [16] The dated notes he recalls, and any replies to them, should be made available so these accounts can be checked.
The President and Tarlochan Singh
Tarlochan Singh’s ability to obtain help also needs to be judged against the access he describes having. He worked in public relations and tourism in Panjab, then helped with publicity for the Asian Games. He served as Giani Zail Singh’s press secretary from 1983 to 1987. [11]
In his June 2022 article, Tarlochan Singh recalls an incident from Zail Singh’s years as Home Minister, before Tarlochan Singh became presidential press secretary. Zail Singh asked Paramjit Singh, the Chief Secretary of Panjab, to invite Sant Harchand Singh Longowal, the Akali Dal president, to Delhi. Tarlochan Singh says that Darbara Singh, Panjab’s Chief Minister, blocked the invitation. Zail Singh told Tarlochan Singh about this.
Tarlochan Singh then contacted Ravi Inder Singh, a former Speaker of the Panjab Assembly, who telephoned Paramjit Singh about the invitation. [11] On this account, Tarlochan Singh could contact senior officials and follow up Zail Singh’s request.
Tarlochan Singh also describes his work after the June 1984 attack. He says he was accused of telling journalists about the damage at Sri Darbar Sahib and was forced to take leave. He was later asked to help with talks involving Indira Gandhi, her son Rajiv Gandhi and Sikh religious officeholders. Tarlochan Singh says he helped bring the Sikh officeholders to Sri Darbar Sahib and passed their proposals to Delhi. [11]
The writer and journalist Khushwant Singh later praised Tarlochan Singh for persuading the Jathedars, senior Sikh religious officeholders, that the President had not been told beforehand about the June operation. In the same account, Khushwant Singh criticised the President’s response to the November killings. [15] That praise does not tell us what Tarlochan Singh did to help families facing the killings.
Tarlochan Singh also argues that Indira Gandhi had been reluctant to confront Sikhs. He points to concessions she had made and Sikhs she had appointed to public office. Those earlier decisions do not tell us what she intended in June 1984. His own account says she later reversed an announced settlement that included reopening Sri Darbar Sahib, lifting curfew and releasing most of those arrested. [11] Her advisers must answer for their own actions, and she remained responsible for her decisions.
Giani Zail Singh after the June attack
In his October 2022 article, Tarlochan Singh says that Zail Singh was kept out of Panjab and Sikh affairs after becoming President and had “no role to play at any point of time”. [11] The evidence below tests that claim.
B.D. Pande was Panjab’s Governor during the June attack. Pande’s memoir says that the President pressed for government officials to be moved to different posts in 1983–84. Some requests came through an unnamed official. Pande wrote from memory, without papers to check his recollections against. [7] If Pande’s recollection is right, the President was trying to influence some decisions about Panjab’s administration.
Pande’s account of 8 June describes houses that were still smouldering, funeral pyres seen from the air, and bodies in the water at Sri Darbar Sahib. Pande also recalls the President’s visit, saying that Zail Singh was distressed and blamed the Panjab administration. [7] Pande’s account leaves unclear which of those scenes the President personally saw. Pande headed the administration the President blamed. I must examine Pande’s own responsibility as well as his account of the visit.
India News, a bulletin published by the Indian High Commission in Ottawa, reported on 15 June that the President was pleased with the army’s restraint and was directing repair work. [8] This government account shows how his visit was presented. It cannot, on its own, establish the army’s restraint.
Repairing Sri Akal Takht Sahib could not answer the families’ questions. They still needed to know what had happened to people trapped in the complex, who had died and who was responsible.
After the June attack, some Sikh soldiers mutinied. At Ramgarh, mutineers killed their commander, Brigadier Puri. A news report from the time also describes soldiers in Sri Ganganagar, in Rajasthan, moving towards Panjab’s border. [17] This was the situation when the President spoke to the country.
The President broadcast on 17 June, nine days after his visit to Sri Darbar Sahib. The 1984 book Agony of Punjab reproduced the English text. The Reuters news agency reported the next day that the President had defended the operation. [9]
In the printed English text, the President describes the traditions at Sri Akal Takht Sahib as having been shattered. The broadcast then quotes Guru Nanak Sahib Ji’s lament, in which Guru Sahib asks the Creator whether the cries of people suffering such slaughter aroused no compassion. It moves from that lament to the lines about the powerful fighting one another and a lion falling on “a flock of sheep”.
In the Shabad, the line translated above as “Creator, You care for all” comes after the lament and before the line about the powerful fighting the powerful. It is the first line of the Rahao. That line is missing from the printed broadcast. I do not know why it was omitted. [1, 9]
Immediately after the quotation, the printed broadcast says: “When no other alternative was left, then the Punjab government had to send the security forces.” [9]
The quoted lines still address the Creator, and the President did not say that the state was the Creator. Yet he included them in his defence of the military action. These lines bring the suffering of the helpless before the Creator, so quoting them cannot establish that the operation was right. The Shabad sets the standard by which the operation must be judged: what happened to people who could not defend themselves, and what decisions put them in danger. The armed men in the complex included members of Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale’s group. Naming those men and listing their weapons could not by itself answer those questions.
The President also criticised calls for Sikhs working for the government, especially soldiers, to leave their posts. The broadcast says, “Religion, in other words, means duty”, and describes failure to honour an oath taken in Guru Sahib’s name as “cowardice and being led astray”. [9] The President was using Guru Sahib’s name to urge Sikhs to remain in government service. That did not explain what a Sikh should do when the government’s actions conflicted with a Sikh’s conscience.
The President had also taken an oath. Under Article 60, he had promised to protect the Constitution and law, to serve India’s people and to work for their well-being. [10] The Constitution limited his powers, but his oath still required him to serve the people. November would test how he used those powers when Sikh families needed protection.
The broadcast also expressed sorrow, criticised Panjab’s administration and promised an investigation into the damage. [9]
The evidence examined here does not show that Tarlochan Singh wrote the broadcast. Nor does it show that either man planned the June attack or organised the November killings. Tarlochan Singh’s June 2022 article records an hour-long meeting between Indira Gandhi and the President after the attack. [11] On that account, the President could speak directly to the Prime Minister after the attack, whatever he had been told beforehand. He still had to explain why he publicly defended the operation.
Khushwant Singh recalled that, after the June attack, Zail Singh asked whether resigning would serve any purpose. Khushwant Singh replied that the Sikh community would still hold the President responsible. [12] UPI reported on 27 September 1984 that Zail Singh said, “I am deeply distressed over these tragic happenings”, and apologised for the assault on Sri Darbar Sahib. [12] I consider that apology together with his June defence of the operation and his continued service as President until 1987. [9, 14]
Appeals to the presidential office in November
In November, I wondered why the President of India had not ordered protection. I did not see him on television pressing for it. But the Constitution limited what he could decide for himself. Article 74 required him to follow his ministers’ advice. He could require them to consider it again, but then had to follow the advice they gave afterwards.
Under Article 78, he could require the Prime Minister to give him information. He could also require the Council of Ministers to consider a minister’s decision if the Council had not already considered it. As a Union territory, Delhi was administered through Lieutenant Governor P.G. Gavai under Article 239. [3, 10] Article 56 allowed the President to resign. [10]
These rules do not show that he used every power and every means of influence available to him. The records checked do not show that ministers told him not to take a particular step to protect people, that he required them to reconsider, or that they refused after reconsidering.
The writer Patwant Singh told the Nanavati Commission that a delegation visited the President on the morning of 1 November and urged him to fulfil his moral and constitutional duty to stop the violence. According to Patwant Singh, the President said he lacked the power to intervene. [3]
The group included three senior retired Sikh officers of the armed forces: Lieutenant General J.S. Aurora, whose name is printed Arora in the Commission report, Air Chief Marshal Arjan Singh and Brigadier Sukhjit Singh. The former ambassador Gurbachan Singh was also with them. I.K. Gujral, who later became Prime Minister, also told the Commission that he joined the group and left disappointed. [3]
Patwant Singh says the group asked the President to speak forcefully to the Prime Minister. The President initially proposed doing so in three or four days. When challenged about the bloodshed, he agreed to speak that afternoon. Patwant Singh says the President did not make the requested radio and television appeal or act on the request to speak to the Chief Ministers then in Delhi. Asked about calling the army, the President said he was not in contact with Home Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao and suggested that Aurora speak to Rao. [3] This concerns an unanswered request for an urgent public appeal; it does not establish that the President never expressed sorrow in November.
I cannot accept a proposal to wait three or four days before speaking to the Prime Minister while people were being killed. The limits on his powers did not make the families’ need less urgent. Vijay Kumar Malhotra, a Delhi leader of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), then an opposition party, also said the President told him he was helpless. Sharad Yadav, visiting with fellow opposition leaders Charan Singh and Karpoori Thakur, described the President as mostly silent and apparently helpless. [3]
In his statement to the Commission, Malhotra said the President telephoned him to ask for help for people who had appealed for protection. The President also asked other members of that opposition party to help. Malhotra said workers were sent. [13] This is evidence of an attempt to help families. It leaves open what protection reached them and what the President obtained from the government responsible for their safety.
Congress was in power, and Zail Singh had been a senior Congress politician before becoming President. [14, 24] Why was he asking an opposition party to arrange protection that the government had a duty to provide? The reported appeals do not establish what protection he obtained from the Congress government. Requests to opposition workers could not replace action by the government responsible for the police.
Madan Lal Khurana, a BJP leader in Delhi, records another intervention in his affidavit. [3, 21] On 3 November, the President asked him to help recover the body of Mr Virdi, whom the President described as his relative. Khurana approached the police, but says they refused to release the body because they had orders against handing bodies to relatives. They supplied the time and place of cremation so the family could attend. [21]
Other bereaved families deserved the same urgency. They too needed help recovering bodies, finding missing relatives and obtaining answers from the police. The refusal to release bodies also required a response from those with the authority to challenge it.
Khushwant Singh told the Nanavati Commission that he telephoned the presidential office for help. A secretary said the President could not come to the telephone. Khushwant Singh was advised to seek shelter in a Hindu household. The Commission’s summary does not name the secretary or give the precise date of the call. [3]
Tarlochan Singh gave his own account in a statement dated 12 December 2001. He described his car being attacked on 31 October and emergency calls received by him and Kulwant Singh, the President’s Private Secretary. Tarlochan Singh said the President at first doubted the reports and asked for more information. [13]
His account of 1 November goes further. At about 3.30 in the afternoon, he says, he and others could see a mob attacking Gurdwara Rakab Ganj Sahib from Rashtrapati Bhavan, the President’s official residence. They heard “shrieks and shouts” which he understood as people calling for help. He says the President also saw and heard the attack. Tarlochan Singh later learned that two Sikhs had been burnt alive there. Tarlochan Singh describes the President as “very much depressed” because he “could do nothing”. [13]
The journalist and oral historian Harpal Singh, himself a survivor of the pogrom, included an interview with Tarlochan Singh in his 2021 Columbia University MA thesis, 1984: Sikh Genocide. Recalling the attack on Gurdwara Rakab Ganj Sahib and screams reaching Rashtrapati Bhavan, Tarlochan Singh said: “But we couldn’t do a thing except sitting around.” [19]
In both accounts, the cries of people facing a mob reached Rashtrapati Bhavan. It makes me angry, and as a Sikh I feel shame that Sikhs in power failed to protect them. Those people needed help from men who could reach the ministers and officials responsible for sending it. Their rescue should have been the most urgent task in that house.
Tarlochan Singh says a security officer had told him that the President’s police escort drove away a mob attacking the President’s car the previous day. [13] Did he ask for protection and medical help to be sent to the Gurdwara? Did he ask whether he or another official could reach it with a security escort? If such requests were refused, who refused them and what did he try next? What help did he obtain for survivors afterwards?
Tarlochan Singh acknowledged that Khushwant Singh asked him for help. [13] This does not identify Tarlochan Singh as the unnamed secretary in Khushwant Singh’s separate account.
On his own published account, I judge that he did not do enough for the people appealing to him. Passing requests to the President did not fulfil his own responsibility as a human being and as a Sikh.
According to Tarlochan Singh, the President telephoned Lieutenant Governor Gavai on 31 October and again on 1 November, suggested army assistance if needed, and complained to ministers at Teen Murti House, where Indira Gandhi’s body lay in state. [3, 13] Tarlochan Singh also said that Arjan Singh and Aurora urged the use of the army to prevent further violence. The President replied that the Government of India had to issue the orders. [13]
Home Minister Rao’s reply says that Rajiv Gandhi was sworn in as Prime Minister at Rashtrapati Bhavan on 31 October. [3] Appointing a Prime Minister under Article 75 was a separate power. [10] Pranab Mukherjee, then India’s Finance Minister and later President, places the ceremony in Ashoka Hall at 6.45 p.m. in his memoir. [23] The Nanavati Commission records assaults on Sikh passers-by from about 2.30 p.m. and the stoning of the President’s entourage at about 5 p.m. near AIIMS, the All India Institute of Medical Sciences hospital, where Indira Gandhi had been taken. Attacks on Sikhs had therefore begun before the swearing-in. The Commission describes the nature and intensity of the attacks as changing from the morning of 1 November, when the violence became systematic and organised. [3]
Tarlochan Singh’s statement describes his own car being attacked before he reached Rashtrapati Bhavan. It dates the stream of emergency calls to him and Kulwant Singh to 7.30–8 p.m., after the ceremony. [13] The statement does not establish that the President and Tarlochan Singh already knew everything those later callers told them. But the President’s entourage and his press secretary had already been attacked.
The new Prime Minister was in the President’s own residence that evening. In Harpal Singh’s interview, Tarlochan Singh says the President asked Rajiv Gandhi to include Buta Singh in the Cabinet to answer criticism that Rajiv was anti-Sikh. [19] Mukherjee gives a different account of the suggestion. [23] On Tarlochan Singh’s account, the President could discuss Cabinet membership directly with Rajiv Gandhi. What protection did the President ask Rajiv Gandhi to arrange for Sikh families already under attack?
Tarlochan Singh describes later failed attempts to reach the Prime Minister by telephone, followed by complaints in person at Teen Murti House the next morning. [3, 13]
In The Khalistan Conspiracy, G.B.S. Sidhu, a former senior intelligence officer, writes that K.C. Singh told him about another request for the President’s help. K.C. Singh was a deputy secretary at Rashtrapati Bhavan in 1984. He recalled that Rao asked the President to help a businessman he knew, Manmohan Singh (a different person from Dr Manmohan Singh, the later Prime Minister), on the evening of 1 November. The businessman was at a farmhouse in South Delhi. According to this account, the President ordered guards to collect him and take him somewhere safe. [20]
The account does not tell us whether the guards brought him to safety or why the Home Minister asked the President for help. If it is accurate, the President gave an order to try to rescue someone. What similar help did he seek for families who could not reach the Home Minister? Helping one person with powerful contacts could not fulfil his responsibility towards everyone else.
The Commission material I have checked does not independently confirm the calls and complaints Tarlochan Singh described seventeen years later. That does not mean they did not happen. Gavai’s explanation to the Commission does not mention a call from the President. Rao denied that he had failed to take steps to speak to the President, but he did not confirm this particular account. [3, 13]
The journalist Kuldip Nayar reported the President’s later explanation that official papers and information had been kept from him, so he had relied on friends and outsiders. [3] That does not explain what happened to the appeals for help that reached his office.
The Commission found no delay or indifference on Home Minister Rao’s part. It held Delhi’s Lieutenant Governor, Gavai, and Police Commissioner S.C. Tandon responsible for the failure to maintain law and order. It made no finding on the presidential office. Its findings therefore do not settle the questions about the President’s conduct. [3]
Zail Singh remained President until July 1987. [14] I believe an honourable response would have been to resign and tell the country what he knew, what protection he had sought and why he could no longer continue. Resigning could not undo the June destruction or remove his responsibility for publicly defending the operation. If he chose to remain, he owed the public an account of what protection his office obtained and what it did to hold those responsible to account.
Tarlochan Singh also remained in service until 1987. [11] His account of being forced to take leave after the June attack does not answer the questions about his actions in November or his later service. His job differed from the President’s, but he too must explain why he remained, what help he obtained for families and what he did to hold those responsible to account. I expect a Sikh in such a position to be prepared to lose it for trying to save lives. If he could not obtain protection, he should have resigned and publicly explained what he had tried and why protection had failed.
Sikh families were left unprotected despite a Sikh President and Sikh officials in positions of power.
Public honours and responsibility
Tarlochan Singh received the Padma Bhushan, one of India’s highest civilian honours, for Public Affairs in 2021. The British Sikh Association honoured him at a House of Lords dinner in 2025. Its report says he received the Sikh Jewel Award, records praise from parliamentarians and describes him as a “global Sikh icon”. The report also records his condemnation of the attack on Sri Darbar Sahib. [14] His condemnation of the attack belongs in the record alongside his 2022 defence of Giani Zail Singh, who publicly defended the operation. [9, 11]
Tarlochan Singh did later raise these killings in public. On 14 December 2009, he called attention in the Rajya Sabha to relief for survivors and punishment of those responsible. In a 2014 interview and at a 2015 book launch, he described the President’s failed attempts to reach Rajiv Gandhi. [25] My question is what he himself did to obtain protection and help while serving in the presidential office from 1984 to 1987, and how his later recollections fit with his 2001 evidence. [13]
When I read of these honours, I think of the families who had asked someone to save them. I cannot put a public figure’s reputation ahead of their unanswered questions. Readers who rely on Tarlochan Singh as an authority on Sikh history deserve the full record of his role, including the President’s public actions and his own, and what his defence leaves out.
What concerns me is what future generations will inherit as history. In twenty, thirty or forty years, a researcher may use Tarlochan Singh’s later accounts without seeing the evidence that challenges them. I feel I must publish that evidence now, so that it is there for those who come after us.
I have put these questions to Tarlochan Singh in writing. If he replies, his reply will be published with this article.
The duty to pursue justice
Giani Zail Singh remained President until July 1987. The Misra Commission investigated the killings while he was still in office. [3, 14] What evidence did the presidential office give that inquiry, and what action did he seek against those accused? Having remained in office, he owed the families sustained efforts to secure investigations and bring perpetrators before the courts. The accounts examined here do not explain how he fulfilled that responsibility. His distress at the killings cannot answer what he did afterwards to help obtain justice.
Tarlochan Singh has his own account to give. Between November 1984 and the end of 2000, what did he do to help bring the perpetrators to justice? He knew that Sikh families had appealed to Rashtrapati Bhavan to save them. His responsibility did not end when he passed on those appeals, or when he left the presidential office in 1987. Families still needed help collecting evidence, finding lawyers and giving testimony without being threatened. [11, 13]
In the sources I have checked, I have not found an identifiable case from those sixteen years in which his intervention helped pursue the perpetrators. [27] He should identify the evidence he supplied to inquiries, the complaints he pressed the authorities to investigate and the families or witnesses he helped through criminal proceedings. He should explain what he did when officials refused to act. If he undertook this work, he should put it before the families, with dates and records wherever possible. If he did not, he must explain why.
For me, leaving these years unexplained is a serious black mark against his public record. These were years of the survivors’ lives, spent seeking justice for people they had lost. I cannot accept an account of distinguished service that leaves unanswered what he did to help them pursue those responsible. His later demands for justice cannot answer for those sixteen years. He must account for his own conduct during them.
The years after the killing
The duty to help did not end when the attacks stopped. The writer Ajeet Cour describes trying to obtain more accommodation, toilets and medical help for displaced families. She asked Dr Harbans Singh Wasir, the President’s physician, to approach the President. Additional accommodation and sanitation were provided, although she could not say whose intervention secured them. She credits Wasir with sending an ambulance and doctors. [22]
These were people driven from their own homes in India’s capital. They needed safe accommodation, food, sanitation, medical treatment and help finding missing relatives. Assistance should not have depended on knowing someone who could reach the President’s physician. I expected the President and his staff to press the government to organise help for all affected families. They should have checked where help was missing and kept pressing until it arrived. The help Cour describes mattered. Her account does not show that the President and his staff did that wider work.
I have not found a verified account of either man visiting bereaved families soon after the killings, comforting them or following up their need for practical help. Such work would help defend their conduct, so I would expect them to describe it. The accounts examined here do not. On the evidence of the appeals and the response described here, I judge that both men failed the families who needed them.
If anyone has a dated report, photograph or first-hand account of such a visit or practical support, I ask them to send it so that I can examine it and correct the record where necessary.
After the killings, families had to find money for food, housing and school while caring for children without the people on whom they had depended. Compensation could not replace those they had lost. Children who escaped physical injury could still lose years of schooling.
Santok Singh was two and a half years old when his father and grandfather were killed. His mother disguised him in girls’ clothes to help him escape. In an account published by the People’s Union for Democratic Rights in 2025, he described being bullied, leaving school and working in insecure jobs. Having lost his own education, he had helped his son pursue a Master’s degree in music. [4]
Survivors also had to pursue those who had destroyed their families. Darshan Kaur described later threats and attacks as she sought justice. [4] Witnesses had to describe the killings repeatedly while still facing intimidation. Justice delayed for decades takes years from the people to whom it is owed.
Children learn about public life when those accused of destroying their families seem better protected than the families themselves. When people are attacked for being Sikh and institutions promising equality fail to provide justice, children have reason to doubt whether those promises include them. Governments and Sikh leaders must answer for these failures. Families need protection, education and practical help.
A family’s survival does not mean the harm has been put right. A mother’s extraordinary work raising children after murder does not lessen the responsibility of those who caused the loss, or remove anyone else’s duty to help.
Guru Nanak Sahib Ji brings ruined lives before the Creator and calls human pride to account. I judge Sikh holders of office by that standard. My real worry is the future. I want our children to see this responsibility lived out by those who lead them. When innocent Sikh lives are next threatened, Sikh leaders must put their protection before the security of their own positions.
For Darshan Kaur, the history includes a husband whose body was never recovered. For Santok Singh, it includes the education he lost and his work to help his son pursue a Master’s degree in music. [4] We must take those losses into account when judging the people who held office. Our children need to know that we can respect a Sikh officeholder and still examine what that person did. However respected a leader may be, these families are still owed answers.
Related work
The Guru’s House, Under Whose Control?
Who Holds the Chain (26 October 2026)
The Duty to Find Out (To follow): a separate essay examining civil administration and policing in Panjab in the 1990s, including the authority of Karan Bir Singh Sidhu (KBS Sidhu), Amritsar’s Deputy Commissioner from 1992 to 1996, and what families needed for protection.
Sources
The English meaning of Gurbani is a plain-language rendering informed by Professor Sahib Singh Ji’s Darpan. The opening is personal recollection.
Checked to 26 October 2026. Checks recorded on 21, 22 and 23 October are retained. Focused checks on 26 October covered the escort and call chronology [13], Cabinet, rescue and relief accounts [19, 20, 21, 22, 23], later parliamentary and press statements [25], constitutional provisions [10], the opposition-party and Congress context [3, 14, 24], and the added identifications. The plain-English revisions are not fresh checks of the other sources; individual entries record the passages consulted and access limits.
[1] Shabad Guru Granth Sahib Ji, Asa, Mahalla 1, Guru Nanak Sahib Ji, Panna 360. The quotation is the Rahao and opening line of stanza 2, not the complete Shabad, which ends ॥੩॥੫॥੩੯॥. SriGranth · SearchGurbani · Guru Granth Darpan.
[2] Government of India, White Paper on Punjab Agitation, 10 July 1984, printed pp. 49–51, sections 27 and 32; Annexure XI, p. 169. The government’s account acknowledges army fire on Sri Akal Takht Sahib and deaths in the complex. Its casualty table combines civilians and those it labels terrorists; it cannot establish a devotees-only or civilian-only toll. Government explanations of necessity or restraint require attribution. Scanned White Paper. The brief explanation of the sites was checked against the SGPC’s descriptions on 22 October 2026: Sri Akal Takht Sahib · Guide to the complex. The operation’s name and month are also identified in the UK Foreign Secretary’s parliamentary statement of 4 February 2014; used here only for the operation’s name and month. Statement.
[3] Justice Nanavati Commission, Report, Volume I (2005): geographical scope, p. 1; death count, pp. 3 and 17; Krishna Nagar, pp. 81–82; Patwant Singh, pp. 123–125; Khushwant Singh, pp. 125–126; Tarlochan Singh, p. 132; Malhotra, pp. 132–133; Sharad Yadav, p. 133; Gujral, pp. 133–134; Kuldip Nayar (printed as Kuldeep Nayyar), pp. 137–138; Gavai’s explanation, pp. 171–173; Rao’s explanation and the Commission’s assessment, pp. 175–178; organised attacks and limits of the leadership finding, pp. 179–183; Khurana’s opposition role, p. 126. At p. 182 the Commission did not find evidence implicating Rajiv Gandhi or other senior Congress (I) leaders in proposing or organising the attacks. That conclusion is reported as the Commission’s, not adopted as a complete account of their conduct. The three military officers are identified as retired in Aurora’s affidavit, read as an online reproduction. The report prints his name as Arora; the affidavit uses J.S. Aurora. The spelling difference was checked on 23 October 2026. Report scan · Searchable reproduction · Affidavit of J.S. Aurora.
[4] People’s Union for Democratic Rights, Delhi 1984: The Long Aftermath (2025), Darshan Kaur, pp. 21–22; Santok Singh, Annexure 4, p. 42. These are survivor accounts collected by the organisation. Report.
[5] Madhu Kishwar, “Gangster Rule: The Massacre of the Sikhs”, Manushi, No. 25, November–December 1984, pp. 10–32; women’s experiences and barriers to reporting sexual violence, especially pp. 13–17. Contemporary field investigation and testimony. Scan · Publisher’s reproduction.
[6] Delhi High Court, State through CBI v. Sajjan Kumar and Others, 17 December 2018, paragraph 367.1, printed p. 191. Judgment.
[7] B.D. Pande, In the Service of Free India: Memoir of a Civil Servant, edited by Ratna M. Sudarshan (Speaking Tiger, 2021), Chapters 12 and 14; Introduction and Preface. Read as an online text reproduction. The Panjab chapters were written in April–May 1986 from memory without retained notes or records; the editor did not substantively verify them. The unnamed messenger carrying posting requests is not identified as Tarlochan Singh. The authorised Rediff excerpt confirms the visit and criticism but omits the detailed scene. Authorised excerpt · Publisher.
[8] High Commission of India, Ottawa, India News, No. 12/84, 15 June 1984, account of the presidential visit. Read as an online transcription of a government bulletin, not independent verification of its claims about the army. Bulletin transcription.
[9] Giani Zail Singh’s 17 June 1984 broadcast, reproduced as “Sanctity of Religion in Secular India”, Agony of Punjab (Patriot Publishers, 1984), Appendix I, pp. 181–186; selections and justification, p. 183; oath and continued service, p. 184. Book scan. The comparison concerns this contemporary printed English reproduction. Original audio and an official typescript have not been checked; no intention behind the omission is asserted. Reuters, The Globe and Mail, 18 June 1984, independently reported the broadcast and the President’s defence of the operation; available here as a transcription. Reuters report.
[10] The Constitution of India, Articles 53, 56, 60, 74, 75, 78 and 239. The earlier official 2024 English–Malayalam edition is retained. The additional 26 October check used the official edition current to 1 May 2026, including amendment footnotes: binding ministerial advice operated from 3 January 1977 and the reconsideration proviso from 20 June 1979. The later Article 239AA arrangement is not applied to 1984. Earlier official text · Additional official text.
[11] Tarlochan Singh, “1984 Punjab Tragedy: Unanswered Questions?”, 30 June 2022, and “Giani Zail Singh and Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale: An Overview”, 7 October 2022; his own later accounts. The June article describes leave followed by renewed negotiations, without establishing a formal reinstatement date. His career page lists presidential press-secretary service in 1983–1987. The October defence’s context is exclusion from Panjab affairs and official information, not a denial that the broadcast occurred. Accuracy checks of the two articles are recorded in [18]. June article · October article · Career account.
[12] Khushwant Singh, Truth, Love and a Little Malice, authorised extract published by Scroll, 6 June 2015, recalling the resignation conversation. UPI, “President apologizes for assault on temple”, 27 September 1984. The UPI account and short quotation were read in full. Memoir extract · UPI archive.
[13] Nanavati Commission statements reproduced by Discover Sikhism: Tarlochan Singh, W-134, 12 December 2001; Vijay Kumar Malhotra, W-140, 10 January 2002. Read as reproductions, not independently inspected signed originals. The Rakab Ganj passage, including the cries for help and the description of the President, was reread on 22 October 2026. The account of his feelings and inability to act is Tarlochan Singh’s, not an independent finding. The 26 October rereading also checked his report of the presidential police escort driving away a mob on 31 October. His authority over that escort and the time of the two deaths relative to his observation have not been established. Tarlochan Singh · Malhotra.
[14] President of India, official profile: Chief Minister of Panjab, 1972–1977; Union Home Minister from 1980; President, 25 July 1982 to 25 July 1987. Government of India, Padma Awards 2021; British Sikh Association, 2025 dinner report. The association’s account is a written report, not an independently verified transcript of speeches. The honours are also examined in Who Holds the Chain (26 October 2026). Presidential profile · Award list · Association’s report.
[15] Khushwant Singh, “Minority-bashing”, reprinted in S. Tarlochan Singh: A Historic Journey, edited by Dr Prabhleen Singh (2023), printed p. 37, credited to Hindustan Times; “Tarlochan’s Help”, p. 40. Later praise supplies no summons date or original document of the claimed intervention. The Indian Express’s archive of its 27 September 1984 coverage reports a tankhaiya declaration, holding the President accountable for religious wrongdoing, on 2 September and subsequent clearance. The relation between these proceedings and Khushwant Singh’s account has not been established. The essay therefore does not claim Tarlochan Singh prevented every declaration or determine his part in the clearance. Book listed on Tarlochan Singh’s site · PDF linked from Tarlochan Singh’s own website · Contemporary coverage recalled by Indian Express.
[16] T.V. Rajeswar, India: The Crucial Years, publisher’s extract, HarperCollins India, 30 October 2015; recollections of rivalry and warnings to Indira Gandhi in 1981–1982. The publisher’s extract could not be opened on 22 or 23 October 2026; the earlier reading is retained.
[17] United Press International, “Mutiny by Sikhs in Indian army”, Toronto Sun, 11 June 1984, read as an online transcription. The report describes the killing of Brigadier Puri at Ramgarh and a separate movement towards Panjab’s border from Sri Ganganagar. UPI’s archive item of the same date also mentions Ganganagar in indexed excerpts checked on 23 October 2026. UPI archive · Newspaper report transcription. Its location in Rajasthan is identified by the Rajasthan Foundation’s Sri Ganganagar profile.
[18] Tarlochan Singh’s June 2022 article gives eight deaths in the Mehta police firing, against eleven in his October article; no resolution of that toll is asserted here. His October article dates the Sikh–Nirankari clash to 19 April 1978 and gives both April 1981 and April 1980 for Gurbachan Singh’s killing. Delhi High Court, Ranjit Singh v. State, 3 October 1997, paragraph 22, records 13 April 1978 and 24 April 1980 respectively. These are source discrepancies, kept in the notes rather than used to settle the wider argument. June article · October article · Judgment.
[19] Harpal Singh, 1984: Sikh Genocide, MA thesis in Oral History, Columbia University, 26 August 2021, pp. 120–123, particularly pp. 122–123. Published interview excerpt; the original recording and complete interview have not been independently checked. Thesis · Columbia’s biographical account. For the differing Cabinet recollection, see [23].
[20] G.B.S. Sidhu, The Khalistan Conspiracy (2020), chapter 12, PDF pp. 193–194. The guards account recounts K.C. Singh’s later recollection. The deployment and outcome have not been independently established. Book. The book expressly distinguishes the businessman from the later Prime Minister. Sidhu’s former intelligence role is identified in his publisher’s biography.
[21] Madan Lal Khurana, affidavit before the Nanavati Commission, paragraphs 5–7, reproduced by Discover Sikhism. The signed original has not been inspected. Affidavit.
[22] Ajeet Cour, “Punjabi writer Ajeet Cour recalls the Black November of 1984”, The Tribune, 27 October 2024. Later personal account, originally written for private circulation in 2014 and translated by Satjit Wadva. Account.
[23] Pranab Mukherjee, The Turbulent Years (2016), participant’s memoir extract, Hindustan Times, 28 January 2016, passage identifying the time and place of Rajiv Gandhi’s swearing-in. Memoir extract. An additional authorised extract, published by Scroll on 1 February 2016, credits Mukherjee himself with recommending Buta Singh and describes the pre-oath ministerial choices. This differs from the attribution and sequence in Tarlochan Singh’s interview in [19]; neither is treated as a complete record of the conversation. Authorised memoir extract. His Finance Ministry and later Presidency are recorded in the official biography.
[24] Election Commission of India, Statistical Report on General Elections, 1980 to the Seventh Lok Sabha, Volume I, List of Successful Candidates, printed p. 77, Punjab, Hoshiarpur: Zail Singh, INC(I). The party entry was read in the indexed text of the government-hosted report; the full PDF was not inspected in this check. Read with the official career record in [14]. Government-hosted report.
[25] Rajya Sabha, Official Report, 14 December 2009, printed p. 208 and Tarlochan Singh’s speech, pp. 211–218, on relief and punishment of those responsible. Official proceedings. Manoj C.G., Rajiv Gandhi didn’t take calls from President after 1984 riots broke out, The Indian Express, 30 January 2014, direct interview report. 2014 report. Sanjay Suri, 1984 riots: When silence spoke so unmistakably, IANS, published by Business Standard, 14 July 2015, account of remarks at his book launch. 2015 account. The latter two report later recollections; the complete recordings have not been independently checked. Failed telephone calls do not contradict the subsequent in-person complaints described in [13].
[26] Punjabi University, The Encyclopaedia of Sikhism, entry Jarnail Singh Bhindranvale, Sant (1947–1984), describes his preaching and appointment as head of Damdami Taksal in August 1977. Encyclopaedia entry. The institution’s own description supports the brief explanation of its teaching purpose.
[27] Focused search on 26 October 2026 for Tarlochan Singh’s personal work on investigations and prosecutions between November 1984 and 31 December 2000. Read with his career account [11] and reproduced testimony [13]. Nanavati Commission, Volume II, Annexure VI, entry 134, dates his testimony to 12 December 2001; Annexure VII lists him among witnesses who had not filed affidavits with that commission. This does not establish what he submitted to earlier inquiries. The targeted public searches did not identify a verified case of his assistance to a prosecution within the period. Presidential files, complete earlier-inquiry submission records and every relevant case file have not been examined. The finding is limited to the sources checked. Official Volume II.
Questions about Tarlochan Singh’s work in 1984 were put to him in writing on 21 October 2026, with a reply date of 27 October. His reply, if any, will be published here with a dated note. Specific corrections from any reader are also welcome.
Errors will be corrected publicly with a dated note.
Strong disagreement is welcome. Contempt is not.
Bhul chuk maaf karni Ji.
Gurjit Singh Sandhu
PanthSeva
London